Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
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Publication:2463429
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Cites work
Cited in
(12)- Learning and sophistication in coordination games
- The optimal strategy in the minimum effort game
- Communication, leadership and coordination failure
- Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment
- Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
- Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players
- Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
- Leadership, coordination, and corporate culture
- The black box as a control for payoff-based learning in economic games
- Leadership and the effective choice of information regime
- Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study
- The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group
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