Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9182-0zbMath1136.91353OpenAlexW2067548262MaRDI QIDQ2463429

Enrique Fatas, David J. Cooper, Jordi Brandts

Publication date: 6 December 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45284

zbMATH Keywords

CoordinationExperimentsHeterogeneous agentsLeadershipOrganizational change

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

The optimal strategy in the minimum effort game, The black box as a control for payoff-based learning in economic games, Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment, Leadership and the effective choice of information regime, Learning and sophistication in coordination games, Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players, Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game

Cites Work

• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
• Unnamed Item