Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players
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Publication:2334820
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.005zbMath1426.91049OpenAlexW2940289419MaRDI QIDQ2334820
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.005
Cites Work
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