Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
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Publication:697943
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2850zbMATH Open1015.91016DBLPjournals/jet/JohnsonCSR02OpenAlexW3125111579WikidataQ57614092 ScholiaQ57614092MaRDI QIDQ697943FDOQ697943
Authors: Eric J. Johnson, Sankar Sen, Talia Rymon, Colin Camerer 
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/22052/
Recommendations
fairnessbargainingexperimental economicsbounded rationalitybehavioral game theorybehavioral economicslimited cognition
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