Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making
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Publication:6185876
DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09941-ZarXiv2106.15844OpenAlexW3185458818MaRDI QIDQ6185876FDOQ6185876
Authors: Benjamin Patrick Evans, Mikhail Prokopenko 
Publication date: 30 January 2024
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: While game theory has been transformative for decision-making, the assumptions made can be overly restrictive in certain instances. In this work, we investigate some of the underlying assumptions of rationality, such as mutual consistency and best response, and consider ways to relax these assumptions using concepts from level- reasoning and quantal response equilibrium (QRE) respectively. Specifically, we propose an information-theoretic two-parameter model called the Quantal Hierarchy model, which can relax both mutual consistency and best response while still approximating level-, QRE, or typical Nash equilibrium behaviour in the limiting cases. The model is based on a recursive form of the variational free energy principle, representing higher-order reasoning as (pseudo) sequential decision-making in extensive-form game tree. This representation enables us to treat simultaneous games in a similar manner to sequential games, where reasoning resources deplete throughout the game-tree. Bounds in player processing abilities are captured as information costs, where future branches of reasoning are discounted, implying a hierarchy of players where lower-level players have fewer processing resources. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the Quantal Hierarchy model in several canonical economic games, {both simultaneous and sequential}, using out-of-sample modelling.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.15844
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bounded rationalityquantal response equilibriumcognitive hierarchyeconomic decisionlevel-kquantal hierarchy
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