Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points

From MaRDI portal
Publication:5564027

DOI10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320zbMath0177.48402OpenAlexW2102794165MaRDI QIDQ5564027

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1968

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320




Related Items

Belief and truth in hypothesised behavioursA non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable typesApproachability in population gamesTHE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMESExistence of equilibrium solution for a non-cooperative game with fuzzy goals and parametersInfrastructure security gamesDistributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibriaWho wants to break the hockey-stick sales pattern in the supply chain?Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signalsRationalizability in general situationsAutonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problemsNetwork routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis frameworkCommon belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemmaBayesian Nash equilibria using extended Werner-like statesPsychology of game playing: introduction to a special issueConvergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefsThe work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory. Nobel seminar, 8 December 1994An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibriumGames with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational ResourcesNear-Nash equilibrium strategies for LQ differential games with inaccurate state informationOptimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departmentsData envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problemsMixed complementarity problems for robust optimization equilibrium in bimatrix game.Agency equilibriumEvolutionary implementation in a public goods gameNonlocal correlations and noise in different settings of a two-player gameModeling, analysis, and dynamics of Bayesian games via matrix-based methodA Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bidsAn epistemic approach to stochastic gamesRobust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly modelSome Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism DesignCoordinated replenishment game and learning under time dependency and uncertainty of the parametersBounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision makingCoalitional game with fuzzy payoffs and credibilistic coreAmbiguity and the Bayesian ParadigmGraphical congestion gamesComputational Efficiency in Multivariate Adversarial Risk Analysis ModelsUnnamed ItemOptimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problemsBayesian incentive compatible beliefsUnnamed ItemSemidefinite complementarity reformulation for robust Nash equilibrium problems with Euclidean uncertainty setsLearning behavior in non-Walrasian economyGuessing the game: an individual's awareness and assessment of a game's existenceModelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logicOne-sided adaptation for infinite-horizon linear quadraticN-person non-zero-sum dynamic games and sensitivity analysisDesigning cost-sharing methods for Bayesian gamesGratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractibleTwo-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferencesDesigning a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibriumEmpirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctionsBelieving in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysisUniversal knowledge-belief structuresThe information operation in a repeated n-person nonzero-sum gameThe coming of game theoryPeter J. HammondAn indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division gamesEntry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effectsList of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997Sharing risk through concession contractsAsymmetric supply chain models implementable with a mechanism designFoundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical resultsSocial interactions under incomplete information with heterogeneous expectationsMeet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledgeDesigning Cost-Sharing Methods for Bayesian GamesA data-driven distributionally robust game using Wasserstein distanceIterated expectations and common priorsThe return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibriaThe value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sidesOn the minimax principle and zero-sum stochastic differential gamesGames with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theoryPerception and information in a competitive location modelOn the logic and role of negative introspection of common beliefRisk management in hierarchical games with random factorsOn a theorem of SchmeidlerCharges and bets: a general characterisation of common priorsAdversarial risk analysis: Borel gamesEx-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanismA parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated riskHierarchical Bayesian analysis of biased beliefs and distributional other-regarding preferences