Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8zbMath1461.91175MaRDI QIDQ2021798

Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; limit pricing; entry deterrence; pooling equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment, Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

Cites Work

• Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
• The value of information in a simple duopoly model
• Games with espionage
• Entry and espionage with noisy signals
• Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model