Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0310-xzbMath1259.91036OpenAlexW1995290152MaRDI QIDQ444125

Sílvia Ferreira Jorge, Cesaltina Pacheco Pires

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/6119

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationproduct differentiationentry deterrencethird-degree price discrimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects

Cites Work

• Reputation and imperfect information
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis

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