Perfect sequential equilibrium
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Publication:1821707
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0zbMath0616.90100WikidataQ29394326 ScholiaQ29394326MaRDI QIDQ1821707
Motty Perry, Sanford J. Grossman
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0
91A05: 2-person games
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Cites Work
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Equilibria
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
