A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
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Publication:909588
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5zbMath0694.90098OpenAlexW2001346959MaRDI QIDQ909588
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5
Related Items (21)
Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection ⋮ Pervasive signaling ⋮ Competition in costly talk ⋮ Deliberative democracy and electoral competition ⋮ Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling ⋮ Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000) ⋮ Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns ⋮ Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining ⋮ Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty ⋮ Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media ⋮ Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium ⋮ Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game ⋮ Evaluating dimensionality in spatial voting models ⋮ Modelling the role of information in elections ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Moderation of an ideological party ⋮ Reciprocity and voting ⋮ Bargaining on behalf of a constituency ⋮ Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
Cites Work
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Sequential Equilibria
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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