Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.008zbMath1419.91254OpenAlexW3121429801WikidataQ129208155 ScholiaQ129208155MaRDI QIDQ1735753

Shintaro Miura

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

misspecificationequilibrium setpersuasion gamesdirect/indirect distortionDownsian voting modelmedia manipulationself-mediatization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Influential news and policy-making

Cites Work

• Media competition and information disclosure
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice
• A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• Disclosure and Choice
• Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
• Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy

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