Communication via a strategic mediator
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Publication:969132
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001zbMath1238.91093OpenAlexW2055988385MaRDI QIDQ969132
Publication date: 11 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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