Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
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Publication:5963300
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Market Making by Price-Setting Firms
- Mediation and peace
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Multilateral Bargaining
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
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