Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.12.011MaRDI QIDQ5963300zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros

Publication date 7 March 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://repository.essex.ac.uk/15749/1/1-s2.0-S0022053115002227-main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingvote buyingintermediariesmiddlemenlegislatures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Reaching across the aisle to block reforms

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Market Making by Price-Setting Firms
• Mediation and peace
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(4)

• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Collective hold‐up
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

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