Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
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Publication:5113183
Recommendations
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- Veto players and non-cooperative foundations of power in legislative bargaining
- Demand bargaining in legislatures
- Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
- Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Predicting behavior in unstructured bargaining with a probability distribution
Cited in
(19)- Demand bargaining in legislatures
- Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
- The legislative calendar
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- Universalism and the value of political power
- Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
- Legislative bargaining with teams
- Executive control and legislative success
- Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
- Equality in legislative bargaining
- Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining
- Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?
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