Veto players and non-cooperative foundations of power in legislative bargaining
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Recommendations
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
- Quantitative evaluation of veto power
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
Cites work
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- Bargaining and Value
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
Cited in
(6)- Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
- Quantitative evaluation of veto power
- Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Veto power in committees: An experimental study
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
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