Veto players and non-cooperative foundations of power in legislative bargaining

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_37MaRDI QIDQ4644775zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Nohn

Publication date 8 January 2019

Published in Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_37

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingShapley-Shubik indexveto playersnoncooperative support for power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
• Quantitative evaluation of veto power
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• On the core and bargaining set of a veto game

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power

Cited in

(6)

• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
• Quantitative evaluation of veto power

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