A new index of power for simple n-person games

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Publication:1251192

DOI10.1007/BF01753239zbMath0389.90093MaRDI QIDQ1251192

J. Deegan, Edward W. Packel

Publication date: 1978

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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