Government versus opposition: who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
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Publication:2457792
DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0207-5zbMATH Open1208.91033OpenAlexW2053409146MaRDI QIDQ2457792FDOQ2457792
Authors: Dinko Dimitrov, Claus-Jochen Haake
Publication date: 23 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315485
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- Some remarks on game theoretical approach to prediction of formation of parliamentary coalitions. The case of Polish elections of 1997
- Agenda control in coalition formation
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- Gabrielle Demange
- POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
- Dynamic analysis of stability of coalition governments in Japan 1993
- An interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation
- Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value
- Evaluation of German parties and coalitions by methods of the mathematical theory of democracy
- Using MACBETH to determine utilities of governments to parties in coalition formation
- Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
- A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
- Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
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