Government versus opposition: who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?

DOI10.1007/s00712-006-0207-5zbMath1208.91033OpenAlexW2053409146MaRDI QIDQ2457792

Claus-Jochen Haake, Dinko Dimitrov

Publication date: 23 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315485

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuesimple gamescoalition formationwinning coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

Related Items

Stable governments and the semistrict core ⋮ A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions ⋮ Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices ⋮ Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• A new model of coalition formation
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES