Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.011MaRDI QIDQ485772zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dominik Karos

Publication date 14 January 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011

zbMATH Keywords

hedonic gamescore stabilityapex gamesstrong monotony

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Dynamic coalition formation in the apex game
• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
• The apex power measure for directed networks
• Core in a simple coalition formation game

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3934814 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Government versus opposition: who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• On the strong monotonicity of power indices
• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures

Cited in

(6)

• Dynamic coalition formation in the apex game
• A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
• A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members
• The apex power measure for directed networks
• Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5351693 (Why is no real title available?)

This page was built for publication: Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q485772)