Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
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Publication:485772
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011zbMath1302.91017OpenAlexW2091408830MaRDI QIDQ485772
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011
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A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members, A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability, Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
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