Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
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Publication:485772
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.011zbMATH Open1302.91017OpenAlexW2091408830MaRDI QIDQ485772FDOQ485772
Authors: Dominik Karos 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011
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Cited In (6)
- The apex power measure for directed networks
- Dynamic coalition formation in the apex game
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
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