Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
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Publication:1810716
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00082-3zbMath1048.91009MaRDI QIDQ1810716
Nadia Burani, William S. Zwicker
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Utility theory for games (91A30)
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