Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
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Publication:4612458
DOI10.3982/TE2870zbMath1419.91040MaRDI QIDQ4612458
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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