On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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Publication:1592723
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0779zbMath1047.91012OpenAlexW2054670965MaRDI QIDQ1592723
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0779
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