Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2013333
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.002zbMATH Open1393.91120OpenAlexW2595959398MaRDI QIDQ2013333FDOQ2013333
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.002
Recommendations
- Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
Cites Work
- Social and economic networks.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
Cited In (6)
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach
This page was built for publication: Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2013333)
