Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets
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Publication:2453399
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Social and economic networks.
Cited in
(9)- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
- A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
- An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
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