Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0708-9zbMath1288.91151MaRDI QIDQ2453399

Burak Can, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_8FC4D31DAB75

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms, Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems, Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets, Consistency and its converse for roommate markets, An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games, Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice, Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities, Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems, A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings

Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage