Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets
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Publication:2453399
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0708-9zbMATH Open1288.91151OpenAlexW2044593199MaRDI QIDQ2453399FDOQ2453399
Authors: Burak Can, Bettina Klaus 
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_8FC4D31DAB75
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Cites Work
- Social and economic networks.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
Cited In (9)
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms
- A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
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