A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Q-stable matchings

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.12.001MaRDI QIDQ2634485zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Péter Biró, Elena Molis, Elena Inarra

Publication date 9 February 2016

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1369412 (Why is no real title available?)
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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
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• The roommates problem revisited
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• The stable crews problem
• When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review

Cited in

(14)

• Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
• The stable fixtures problem -- a many-to-many extension of stable roommates
• The roommates problem revisited
• A bargaining set for roommate problems
• Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem
• A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
• The roommate problem with externalities
• Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
• Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem
• Stochastic stability for roommate markets
• The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
• Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems

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