A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Q-stable matchings
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Publication:2634485
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.12.001zbMATH Open1347.91200OpenAlexW2217738525MaRDI QIDQ2634485FDOQ2634485
Péter Biró, Elena Molis, Elena Inarra
Publication date: 9 February 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.001
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Cites Work
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Cited In (8)
- A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem
- The stable fixtures problem -- a many-to-many extension of stable roommates
- A bargaining set for roommate problems
- Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem
- Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
- Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
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