The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
This paper studies the dynamics of stable marriage and stable roommates markets. The main tool of this paper is the algorithm of Roth and Vande Vate and its generalization by Tan and Hsueh. Beyond proposing alternative proofs for known results, some of them are generalized to the nonbipartite case. In particular, it is shown that the lastcomer gets his best stable partner in both algorithms. Consequently, it is better to arrive later than earlier to a stable rommates market. This paper also proves that when the equilibrium is restored after the arrival of a new agent, some agents will be better off under any stable solution for the new market than at any stable solution for the original market. A procedure to find these agents is proposed.
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- A generalization of the stable matching problem
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- An upper bound for the solvability probability of a random stable roommates instance
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On a generalization of the stable roommates problem
- On a lemma of Scarf.
- On randomized matching mechanisms
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Paths to marriage stability
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- The integral stable allocation problem on graphs
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
- On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- Online 2-stage stable matching
- The dynamics of rank-maximal and popular matchings
- Unsolvability and beyond in many-to-many non-bipartite stable matching
- A note on the characterization of stable matchings for general preferences: a fixed point approach
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
- A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
- Rotations in the stable b-matching problem
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