The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0084-3MaRDI QIDQ2482674zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner, Katarina Cechlárová

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0084-3

zbMATH Keywords

stable marriage problemstable roommates problemmatching mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A generalization of the stable matching problem
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• An upper bound for the solvability probability of a random stable roommates instance
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On a generalization of the stable roommates problem
• On a lemma of Scarf.
• On randomized matching mechanisms
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Paths to marriage stability
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• ``Timing is everything and marital bliss

Cited in

(16)

• A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
• Rotations in the stable \(b\)-matching problem
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
• A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
• On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
• The integral stable allocation problem on graphs
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
• Online 2-stage stable matching
• Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
• Analysis of stochastic matching markets
• The dynamics of rank-maximal and popular matchings
• ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples

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