The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0084-3zbMATH Open1145.91041OpenAlexW2057990406MaRDI QIDQ2482674FDOQ2482674

Authors: Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner, Katarina Cechlárová 

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0084-3

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zbMATH Keywords

stable marriage problemstable roommates problemmatching mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• On a lemma of Scarf.
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
• A generalization of the stable matching problem
• On randomized matching mechanisms
• Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• An upper bound for the solvability probability of a random stable roommates instance
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• On a generalization of the stable roommates problem
• Paths to marriage stability

Cited In (16)

• A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
• Rotations in the stable \(b\)-matching problem
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
• ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
• On the stable matchings that can be reached when the agents go marching in one by one
• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
• The integral stable allocation problem on graphs
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
• Online 2-stage stable matching
• Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
• The dynamics of rank-maximal and popular matchings
• Analysis of stochastic matching markets
• ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples

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