On randomized matching mechanisms
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Publication:1814960
DOI10.1007/s001990050097zbMath0859.90009MaRDI QIDQ1814960
Publication date: 12 December 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050097
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