Median stable matching for college admissions

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6zbMath1092.91063OpenAlexW2122572911MaRDI QIDQ2491093

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 26 May 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingStabilityFairnessCollege admissions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (19)

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Cites Work

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• On the existence of fair matching algorithms
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• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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