The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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Publication:3821889
DOI10.2307/1911052zbMath0668.90004OpenAlexW2039554452MaRDI QIDQ3821889
Marilda Sotomayor, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911052
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