Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1414616

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00096-6zbMath1068.91059OpenAlexW2034883132MaRDI QIDQ1414616

David Gale, Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 4 December 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6




Related Items (44)

A coloring property for stable allocationsMedian stable matchings in two-sided marketsVon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problemsInterdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignmentThe object allocation problem with random prioritiesIncentivizing resilience in financial networksFinding a Stable Allocation in Polymatroid IntersectionMatching with partially ordered contractsStrategy-proof Pareto-improvementThe vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraintsReview of the theory of stable matchings and contract systemsStable matching: An integer programming approachSchool choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft boundsChoice functions on posetsDominant strategy implementation of stable rulesContracts versus salaries in matching: a general resultComparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching marketsOn Lattice and DARationalizable choice functionsThe integral stable allocation problem on graphsA Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower QuotasSubstitutes and stability for matching with contractsThe stable roommates problem with choice functionsA many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'Stable schedule matchingsFair and efficient student placement with couplesCharacterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanismGraduate admission with financial supportFractional matching marketsFractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchingsProbabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problemsContract design and stability in many-to-many matchingA college admissions clearinghouseApplications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economicsA general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functionsStability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couplesStable matchings and preferences of couplesOn Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice RulesSubstitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contractsQuantile stable mechanismsStable Matching in Large EconomiesMonotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contractsAgreement toward stability in matching marketsOn the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market



Cites Work


This page was built for publication: Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.