Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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Publication:1414616
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00096-6zbMath1068.91059OpenAlexW2034883132MaRDI QIDQ1414616
Publication date: 4 December 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6
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Cites Work
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- The assignment game. I: The core
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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