Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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Publication:1414616
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00096-6zbMATH Open1068.91059OpenAlexW2034883132MaRDI QIDQ1414616FDOQ1414616
Authors: David Gale, Ahmet U. Alkan 
Publication date: 4 December 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6
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