Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
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Publication:521881
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0525-3zbMath1398.91460OpenAlexW2272261776MaRDI QIDQ521881
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/17195/1/17195.pdf
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)
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