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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- My encounters with David Gale
- A note on Roth's consensus property of many-to-one matching
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- On treewidth and stable marriage: parameterized algorithms and hardness results (complete characterization)
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- A \((2-c\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})\)-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- ReGale: some memorable results
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
- Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem
- Popularity vs maximum cardinality in the stable marriage setting
- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
- Size versus stability in the marriage problem
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Stable schedule matchings
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- An improved approximation lower bound for finding almost stable maximum matchings
- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- On classical and modern marriage problems
- Algorithms and complexity of strongly stable non-crossing matchings
- A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
- Maximum locally stable matchings
- Randomized approximation of the stable marriage problem
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- Maximum stable matching with one-sided ties of bounded length
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties.
- A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
- Relationship between matching and assignment problems
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- Popular matchings with multiple partners
- Popular matchings with lower quotas
- Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
- The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Double-edged population monotonicity of Walrasian equilibrium -- a note on the nature of competition
- Stable multi-skill workforce assignments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
- Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem
- An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
- Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
- Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- A branch-and-price algorithm for stable workforce assignments with hierarchical skills
- Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
- Improved approximation algorithms for two variants of the stable marriage problem with ties
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
- Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
- Cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm with complete preference lists
- Vacancies in supply chain networks
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems
- What are stable matchings good for? Stable matchings and their applications
- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Jointly stable matchings
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Jointly stable matchings
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