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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
- Quasi-popular matchings, optimality, and extended formulations
- An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley ``propose-and-reject algorithm
- Decentralized job matching
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Constrained school choice
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- Maximum matchings and popularity
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- On the number of employed in the matching model
- On the invariance of male optimal stable matching
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
- Incomplete list setting of the hospitals/residents problem with maximally satisfying lower quotas
- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Balanced stable marriage: how close is close enough?
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
- Applications of game theory to economics
- Algorithmic aspects of equilibria of stable marriage model with complete preference lists
- Dynamically stable matching
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions
- Approximation algorithms for hard variants of the stable marriage and hospitals/residents problems
- A further note on the college admission game
- Stable marriage with general preferences
- Two problems in max-size popular matchings
- On the contracts between doctors and rural hospitals
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- On the approximability of the stable matching problem with ties of size two
- Discrete load balancing on complete bipartite graphs
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues
- Stable outcomes for two-sided contract choice problems
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
- Stable matchings and stable partitions∗
- Courtship and linear programming
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Stable matchings, one-sided ties, and approximate popularity
- Verification protocol for stable matching from conditional disclosure of secrets
- A 25/17-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties
- Sex-equal stable matchings: complexity and exact algorithms
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- My encounters with David Gale
- A note on Roth's consensus property of many-to-one matching
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- On treewidth and stable marriage: parameterized algorithms and hardness results (complete characterization)
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- A \((2-c\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})\)-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem
- Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings
- Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- ReGale: some memorable results
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
- Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem
- Popularity vs maximum cardinality in the stable marriage setting
- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
- Size versus stability in the marriage problem
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Stable schedule matchings
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- An improved approximation lower bound for finding almost stable maximum matchings
- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- On classical and modern marriage problems
- Algorithms and complexity of strongly stable non-crossing matchings
- A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
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