Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.STACS.2019.21OpenAlexW2964055542MaRDI QIDQ5090469FDOQ5090469

Authors: Ágnes Cseh, Attila Juhos 

Publication date: 18 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00392

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zbMATH Keywords

posetstable marriageacyclic preferencesintransitivityweakly stable matchingstrongly stable matchingsuper stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Matching theory
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with stable score-limits
• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• Preference structures and their numerical representations
• Functional analysis
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• A Theory of Divided Government
• Stable marriage and indifference
• The structure of stable marriage with indifference
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stable marriage with general preferences
• Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
• The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
• Strongly stable matchings in time O ( nm ) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
• Characterisation of strongly stable matchings
• Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

Cited In (4)

• A Size-Popularity Tradeoff in the Stable Marriage Problem
• Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences

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