Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.STACS.2019.21MaRDI QIDQ5090469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ágnes Cseh, Attila Juhos

Publication date 18 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00392

zbMATH Keywords

posetstable marriageacyclic preferencesintransitivityweakly stable matchingstrongly stable matchingsuper stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617265 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962834 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Divided Government
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• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Characterisation of strongly stable matchings
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with stable score-limits
• Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
• Functional analysis
• Matching theory
• Preference structures and their numerical representations
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable marriage with general preferences
• Strongly stable matchings in time \(O(nm)\) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice
• The structure of stable marriage with indifference

Cited in

(4)

• A Size-Popularity Tradeoff in the Stable Marriage Problem
• Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6672022 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences

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