A Theory of Divided Government
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5689663
DOI10.2307/2171833zbMath0862.90046OpenAlexW2081739946MaRDI QIDQ5689663
Howard Rosenthal, Alberto Alesina
Publication date: 7 January 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34222831
conditional sinceritycoalition proof Nash equilibriacoalition proof type refinementsmidterm cyclespatial theory of voting
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