Electing a parliament

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0635-1zbMath1288.91173OpenAlexW2169986852MaRDI QIDQ2452119

Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris, Giovanna Iannantuoni

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0635-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting ⋮ Moderating government

Cites Work

• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?
• A Theory of Divided Government

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