Electing a parliament
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452119
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0635-1zbMath1288.91173MaRDI QIDQ2452119
Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris, Giovanna Iannantuoni
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0635-1
Related Items
Cites Work
- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
- A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?
- A Theory of Divided Government