Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
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Publication:4206589
DOI10.1287/moor.14.4.575zbMath0687.90097OpenAlexW2142845115MaRDI QIDQ4206589
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.4.575
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