Equivalence and invariance of the index and degree of Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0516zbMath0891.90175OpenAlexW2062556595MaRDI QIDQ1378014

Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date: 5 February 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fb471292ba87d7dafbdb920d4ceb6b4b6b6120a2

zbMATH Keywords

existence theoremsNash equilibriadegreeindexstable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (9)

A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities ⋮ Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations ⋮ On sustainable equilibria ⋮ A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria. ⋮ Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games ⋮ On the indices of zeros of Nash fields ⋮ On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability ⋮ On (un)knots and dynamics in games ⋮ Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Essential Sets and Fixed Points

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