Equivalence and invariance of the index and degree of Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0516zbMATH Open0891.90175OpenAlexW2062556595MaRDI QIDQ1378014FDOQ1378014

Authors: Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson 

Publication date: 5 February 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fb471292ba87d7dafbdb920d4ceb6b4b6b6120a2

Recommendations

• A sufficient condition for invariance of essential components
• Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games
• Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium
• Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
• Essential equilibria

zbMATH Keywords

indexexistence theoremsNash equilibriadegreestable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Essential Sets and Fixed Points
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games

Cited In (12)

• Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
• A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.
• A complementary pivot algorithm for market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities
• Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points
• Universality of Nash components
• Essential equilibria
• On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
• On sustainable equilibria
• On (un)knots and dynamics in games
• Decomposition of games: some strategic considerations
• Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

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