A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games
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Publication:3140532
DOI10.1287/moor.18.3.548zbMath0804.90144OpenAlexW2116353405MaRDI QIDQ3140532
Ennio Stacchetti, David G. Pearce, Faruk Gul
Publication date: 1993
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/de30d750684259ff2e016f11b5a063ebd14db3fc
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