Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation
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Publication:953636
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(03)00108-8zbMath1200.91019MaRDI QIDQ953636
Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson
Publication date: 6 November 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Noncooperative games (91A10) Methods of quasi-Newton type (90C53) Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming (90C59) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
Related Items (15)
The Polymatrix Gap Conjecture ⋮ A decomposition algorithm for \(N\)-player games ⋮ Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory ⋮ A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria. ⋮ Automated equilibrium analysis of \(2\times 2\times 2\) games ⋮ Multiple oracle algorithm to solve continuous games ⋮ Action-graph games ⋮ On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games ⋮ A differentiable homotopy method to compute perfect equilibria ⋮ Computing approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games ⋮ A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence ⋮ Zero-sum polymatrix games with link uncertainty: a Dempster-Shafer theory solution ⋮ Partially observable game-theoretic agent programming in Golog ⋮ Complementarity enhanced Nash's mappings and differentiable homotopy methods to select perfect equilibria ⋮ Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
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