The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1223026
DOI10.1007/BF01766187zbMath0319.90078MaRDI QIDQ1223026
Publication date: 1975
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
On the use (and abuse) of logic in game theory, Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games, A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection, The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods, Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) coordination games, The tracing procedure: A self-correcting reasoning procedure, Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria, On the implications of integrating linear tracing procedure with imprecise probabilities, A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information, Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory, Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games, A stable and consistent solution to distribution problems, Distributive justice in taxation, Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems, A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games, Stability and the Nash solution, Static game theory models and their applications in management science, Games with imperfectly observable commitment, A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games, An algorithm for equilibrium selection in generalized Nash equilibrium problems, On sustainable equilibria, Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information, Slicing the Nash equilibrium manifold, Conflict dissolution by reframing game payoffs using linear perturbations, Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core, Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries, A mixed 0-1 linear programming approach to the computation of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a finite \(n\)-person game in normal form, Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games, How to select a solution in generalized Nash equilibrium problems, On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy, Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems, Bayesian learning in normal form games, Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation, Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in \(N\)-person games, Bargaining under strike: A differential game view, Equilibrium selection in the one seller and many buyers-game, Learning game theory from John Harsanyi, List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997, A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games, The optimal bankruptcy rule in a trading economy using fiat money, Generalized solution principles and outranking relations in multi- criteria decision-making, Efficient management of interconnected power systems: A game-theoretic approach, A best-response approach for equilibrium selection in two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problems, EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES, An algorithmic approach toward the tracing procedure for bi-matrix games, A remark on the Harsanyi-Selten theory of equilibrium selection, Equilibrium selection in a bargaining problem with transaction costs, Universally converging adjustment processes -- a unifying approach., Complementarity enhanced Nash's mappings and differentiable homotopy methods to select perfect equilibria, The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
Cites Work
