Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries
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Publication:1165169
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90055-5zbMath0486.90094MaRDI QIDQ1165169
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90055-5
Nash equilibrium; bargaining games; risk-dominance; payoff-dominance; Harsanyi-Selten solution theory; net stratetic distances; primitive equilibrium points; uniformly perturbed game form
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997, The tracing procedure: A self-correcting reasoning procedure, Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games, Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games, Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining, Equilibrium selection in the one seller and many buyers-game
Cites Work
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