A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
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Publication:5678699
DOI10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80zbMath0262.90087MaRDI QIDQ5678699
Reinhard Selten, John C. Harsanyi
Publication date: 1972
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80
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