Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
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Publication:869865
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.004zbMATH Open1142.91486OpenAlexW2047999842MaRDI QIDQ869865FDOQ869865
Authors: Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano 
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.004
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Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
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- Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
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- The bargaining problem
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- On weighted Shapley values
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
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- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
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- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
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- Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
- An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution
Cited In (19)
- Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases
- A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- On the nucleolus as a power index
- The bargaining correspondence: when Edgeworth meets Nash
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
- Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
- Negotiable votes
- Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
- Consensus reaching in committees
- Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
- Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
- Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
- A bargaining theory of the firm
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Voting and power
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