Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
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Recommendations
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- Bargaining and Value
- Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
- Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- On weighted Shapley values
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
- The bargaining problem
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
Cited in
(19)- On the nucleolus as a power index
- Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases
- Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
- Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Voting and power
- A bargaining theory of the firm
- A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- The bargaining correspondence: when Edgeworth meets Nash
- Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
- Consensus reaching in committees
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
- Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
- Negotiable votes
- Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
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