Value Theory Without Efficiency
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Publication:3960502
DOI10.1287/moor.6.1.122zbMath0496.90096OpenAlexW2134063650MaRDI QIDQ3960502
Abraham Neyman, Pradeep Dubey, Robert J. Weber
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0513.pdf
Shapley valuenonatomic gamessemivalueefficiency axiomsymmetric positive linear operatorspace of games
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