Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality

DOI10.1007/BF00735765zbMath0666.90096WikidataQ59973055 ScholiaQ59973055MaRDI QIDQ1117150

Terje Lensberg, William Thomson

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00735765

zbMATH Keywords

Nash solution; bargaining; disagreement solution; axiomatic characterization; Pareto Optimality; variable number of agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Truncated leximin solutions, Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization, Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space, On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria, Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution, Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality, Bargaining solutions and relative guarantees, A generalization of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution, Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution

Cites Work

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