Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem

DOI10.1287/moor.2.1.64zbMath0413.90089OpenAlexW2094460348MaRDI QIDQ3048627

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5d3692b9c081ef2869bdb5a05da2dfdc2c756013

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining problemPareto optimalitytwo-person cooperative gameaxiom of individual rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

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