Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality

DOI10.1007/BF00735765MaRDI QIDQ1117150zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Terje Lensberg, William Thomson

Publication date 1988

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00735765

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterizationbargainingdisagreement solutionNash solutionPareto Optimalityvariable number of agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

We consider the bargaining problem with a variable number of agents. The first author [J. Econ. Theory 45, No.2, 330-341 (1988; Zbl 0657.90106)] had previously characterized the Nash solution as the only solution to satisfy the following axioms: Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, and Multilateral Stability. We show that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto Optimality.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(26)

• Individual and collective opportunities
• The Pareto set of the partition bargaining problem
• Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution
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• Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
• The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: a strengthening of Roth's result
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• A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48311 (Why is no real title available?)
• Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2162234 (Why is no real title available?)
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• On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory
• Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality
• Bargaining solutions and relative guarantees

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