On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.02.023MaRDI QIDQ553393zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date 27 July 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/64776006/Herings_2011_on_the_asymptotic_uniqueness_of.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingNash bargaining solutionsubgame perfect equilibriummultiplicity of equilibriumstationary strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Bargaining and Value
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality
• Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Note on the equal split solution in an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game
• One-dimensional bargaining
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.

Cited in

(9)

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
• Bargaining with asymmetric threat points
• Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Bargaining under liquidity constraints: unified strategic foundations of the Nash and Kalai solutions
• UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
• A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings
• Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

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