On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.02.023zbMATH Open1217.91066OpenAlexW3125301194MaRDI QIDQ553393FDOQ553393
Authors: P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski 
Publication date: 27 July 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/64776006/Herings_2011_on_the_asymptotic_uniqueness_of.pdf
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bargainingNash bargaining solutionsubgame perfect equilibriummultiplicity of equilibriumstationary strategies
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Bargaining and Value
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space
- One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
- Note on the equal split solution in an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game
- One-dimensional bargaining
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
Cited In (9)
- A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
- Bargaining with asymmetric threat points
- Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Bargaining under liquidity constraints: unified strategic foundations of the Nash and Kalai solutions
- UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
- A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings
- Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
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