Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
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Publication:3560090
DOI10.1142/S0219198909002406zbMATH Open1193.91059OpenAlexW3125495863MaRDI QIDQ3560090FDOQ3560090
Authors: Huibin Yan 
Publication date: 19 May 2010
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002406
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Noncooperative selection of the core
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- Multilateral Bargaining
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
Cited In (11)
- Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
- Dynamic multilateral markets
- On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
- Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Equality in legislative bargaining
- UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
- Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
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