Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
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Publication:3560090
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Cites work
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- Multilateral Bargaining
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
- Noncooperative selection of the core
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Cited in
(11)- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
- Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
- Dynamic multilateral markets
- On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
- Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Equality in legislative bargaining
- UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
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