UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002406zbMath1193.91059MaRDI QIDQ3560090

Huibin Yan

Publication date: 19 May 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002406

zbMATH Keywords

coalition; unique; random proposer; multilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Equality in legislative bargaining, Coalition formation in games with externalities, Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics, Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application, Dynamic multilateral markets, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

Cites Work

• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Noncooperative selection of the core
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Multilateral Bargaining
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities