Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players

DOI10.1111/IJET.12078zbMATH Open1398.91026OpenAlexW2273803516MaRDI QIDQ4584801FDOQ4584801

Authors: Hülya Eraslan 

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12078

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zbMATH Keywords

uniquenesslegislative bargainingnoncooperative bargainingmultilateral bargainingrisk-averse players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cited In (6)

• Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
• Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
• Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining
• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

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