Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players

DOI10.1111/IJET.12078MaRDI QIDQ4584801zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hülya Eraslan

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12078

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenesslegislative bargainingnoncooperative bargainingmultilateral bargainingrisk-averse players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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(6)

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• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
• Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining
• Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
• Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

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