Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9520-1zbMATH Open1378.91111OpenAlexW3122950583WikidataQ57451025 ScholiaQ57451025MaRDI QIDQ2629323FDOQ2629323

Authors: Levent Celik, Bilgehan Karabay 

Publication date: 6 July 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1

Recommendations

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model

zbMATH Keywords

veto playersmultilateral bargainingequilibrium uniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments

Cited In (3)

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

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