Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9520-1MaRDI QIDQ2629323zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Levent Celik, Bilgehan Karabay

Publication date 6 July 2016

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1

zbMATH Keywords

veto playersmultilateral bargainingequilibrium uniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3781003 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Game theory
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(3)

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

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