Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.006zbMATH Open1458.91104OpenAlexW2953434522MaRDI QIDQ1995479FDOQ1995479
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.006
Recommendations
Markov perfect equilibriumlaboratory experimentsveto powerdynamic legislative bargainingendogenous status quodistributive politicsstanding committees
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
- Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
- Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
- Veto power in committees: An experimental study
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- The Farsighted Stable Set
- Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
- On dynamic compromise
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
- Political Economy of Redistribution
Cited In (9)
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
- Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
- BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- A signaling theory of congressional oversight
This page was built for publication: Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1995479)
