Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.006MaRDI QIDQ1995479zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Salvatore Nunnari

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumlaboratory experimentsveto powerdynamic legislative bargainingendogenous status quodistributive politicsstanding committees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 (Why is no real title available?)
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• An experimental study of collective deliberation
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• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
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• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
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• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
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• The dynamics of distributive politics
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• Veto power in committees: An experimental study

Cited in

(17)

• Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Veto players and non-cooperative foundations of power in legislative bargaining
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• A signaling theory of congressional oversight
• Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
• The dynamics of distributive politics

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